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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Cause of Action Dismissed if Plaintiff
Fails to Waive Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Plaintiff, Nancy Christenson, commenced an action for di-
vorce alleging cruel and inhuman treatment on the part of her
husband. She sought temporary and permanent custody of her
three minor children, alimony, support money, property division
and attorney's fees. Defendant, Otto Christenson, denied plain-
tiff's charges and entered a counterclaim seeking an absolute
divorce and custody of the three minor children. He alleged
cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery on the part of the
plaintiff. Pursuant to Rules 26 and 36 of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for District Courts, defendant sought information with re-
spect to plaintiff's alleged misconduct by way of deposition and
request for admissions. Plaintiff refused both upon cross-ex-
amination and in the requests for admissions to divulge any in-
formation concerning her alleged misconduct. Her reasoning was
that the answers and/or admissions might be self-incriminating
and were therefore privileged under the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution1 and also under the Constitution of
the State of Minnesota, article 1, section 7.2 Defendant made a
Rule 37 motion for an order to compel plaintiff to respond or in
the alternative to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in the event of her
refusal to comply with the order. The district court denied de-
fendant's motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that although the plaintiff could not be compelled to waive
her privilege against self-incrimination, she could be compelled to
dismiss her cause of action unless the privilege was waived and
a response given to the deposition questions and the request for
admissions. Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 162 N.W.
2d 194 (1968).
The court, viewing Christenson as a case of first impression
in Minnesota, 3 relied heavily on authority from other jurisdic-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that in a criminal case no per-
son shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Judicial deci-
sions have extended this protection to civil proceedings. See note 3
infra and accompanying text.
2. MmNN. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 provides "No person shall be .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." As
with the federal guarantee, this protection has been judicially extended
to civil cases. See note 3 infra and accompanying text.
3. Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 510, 162 N.W.2d 194,
196 (1968). The reader will note that the analysis of Christenson is not
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tions. It cited extensively a divorce case decided by the Missouri
Supreme Court, Franklin v. Franklin.4 In Franklin, the plaintiff
refused to answer certain interrogatories on the ground that her
answers might tend to incriminate her. The Missouri court held
that one seeking affirmative relief could not invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination and at the same time petition the court
for the requested relief. Plaintiff was compelled either to answer
the interrogatories or to have her pleadings stricken.5 The court
also pointed to other types of civil cases from other jurisdictions
which had adopted reasoning similar to that in Franklin.0
The Christenson court cited as controlling, Brown v. United
States,7 wherein the United States Supreme Court held the rule
applicable in criminal cases-that one who takes the stand in his
own behalf cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion upon cross-examination with respect to matters made rele-
vant by his direct examination-applicable to civil cases also. The
analogy is, of course, that a plaintiff by seeking affirmative relief
and then failing to comply with pre-trial discovery proceedings
places himself in the same situation as the plaintiff who takes
the stand in his own behalf and then refuses to testify upon cross-
examination. However, it should be noted that the holding in
Brown is limited to matters made relevant by plaintiff's direct ex-
amination. It is only as to these matters that plaintiff may not
invoke the privilege. Thus, in order to follow the- Christenson
court's analogy to Brown, it must be assumed that the filing of a
preceded by a synopsis of the historical background of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Since treatises have been written on the
subject and any treatment herein would of necessity be superficial, it
has been intentionally omitted. It suffices to state that the privilege is
guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
and that this privilege is made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The privilege is also
guaranteed by article 1, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution. Al-
though both the federal and state guarantees refer specifically to crimi-
nal proceedings, it has also been extended to civil cases. See, e.g.,
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Graham v. United States,
99 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1938).
4. 365 Mo. 442, 283 S.W.2d 483 (1955).
5. Id. at 445, 283 S.W.2d at 485 (1955).
6. Authority cited included another divorce case-Annest v. An-
nest, 49 Wash. 2d 62, 298 P.2d 483 (1956); a case where plaintiff was
alleged to have purchased a judgment for the purpose of bringing suit
on it, thereby violating the New York Penal Law-Levine v. Born-
stein, 13 Misc. 2d 161, 174 N.Y.S.2d 547, affd, 7 App. Div. 2d 995, 183
N.Y.S.2d 868, affd 6 N.Y.2d 892, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702
(1948); and a case involving an alleged federal anti-trust violation-
Independent Products Corp. v. Loews, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (1958).
7. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
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cause of action by plaintiff is equivalent to direct examination
and as such has made relevant her adulterous conduct if any.
If plaintiff had alleged adultery on the part of defendant as
grounds for divorce, then the analogy between testimony on di-
rect examination and the mere filing of civil action would seem
proper. The statutory law of Minnesota provides that when a
divorce action is brought and adultery is alleged as the grounds,
the court may deny a divorce when it is proved that plaintiff has
also been guilty of adultery under such circumstances as would
have entitled the defendant, if innocent, to a divorce.8 Thus, one
could argue that a plaintiff whose cause of action is based on
adultery on the part of the defendant waives his privilege against
self-incrimination with respect to his own adultery at the pre-trial
level by filing his complaint. However, the plaintiff in Chris-
tenson alleged cruel and inhuman treatment on the part of the
defendant and made no reference to adultery. Therefore, the
logical extension of the Brown analogy is that the mere filing of a
divorce action by the plaintiff is the equivalent of his taking the
stand and thereby waiving his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion with respect to all possible relevant facts. This, of course,
would mean that the privilege against self-incrimination would be
basically nonexistent for those seeking affirmative relief in a
divorce action.
The court also cites Wanek v. City of Winona,9 a Minnesota
case in which the plaintiff in a personal injury case was required
to submit to a physical examination or have his cause of action
dismissed.10 The Wanek decision holds that where plaintiff seeks
recovery for personal injuries, he puts his physical condition in
issue and thereby impliedly consents in advance to do justice-
either submit to a physical examination or have his action dis-
missed. In the strict sense the analogy to Wanek is inappro-
priate as is the analogy to Brown. As discussed above, unless
plaintiff places her alleged adulterous conduct in issue by merely
filing a divorce action, the analogy is not sound. If the adulterous
conduct becomes relevant in such a manner, presumably all other
conduct becomes relevant in a similar manner and the privilege
against self-incrimination would seem to be unavailable to one
seeking affirmative relief if he wishes to pursue the action.
Although the analogies to Brown and Wanek may be un-
8. MiNN. STAT. § 518.08(4) (1969).
9. 78 Minn. 98, 80 N.W. 851 (1899).
10. Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 523-24, 162 N.W.2d
194, 204 (1968).
[Vol. 55:348
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sound in the strict legal sense, the policy reasons compelling the
holdings are similar. The court in each situation sought to elicit
all relevant facts rather than be forced to rely on a version of the
facts most favorable to one of the parties. In this respect the
Christenson holding is in accord with Brown and Wanek, and in
this sense it is defensible. One cannot argue with necessity for
complete disclosure of all relevant facts as long as the parties are
accorded adequate protection of their constitutional right."1
Had the Minnesota court relied solely upon the reasoning and
decision in Franklin there would be less question as to limits
which should be placed around the Christenson decision. If this
were the only case cited, the Christenson holding could be limited
to the statement that a plaintiff in a divorce case may not invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination in pre-trial proceedings
without having his pleadings stricken -.1 2 However, the decision is
summed up as follows: 'While plaintiff cannot be compelled to
waive her privilege against self-incrimination, in this divorce
action, as in any other civil action, she must either waive it or
have her action dismissed"'.3 (emphasis added). The clause "as
in any other civil action" would seem to indicate that the decision
is not limited to divorce matters. This assumption is buttressed
by the fact that the court does not limit its authority to divorce
decisions.
Recent Supreme Court decisions such as Malloy v. Hogan,4
Griffin v. California15 and Spevack v. Klein"0 raise serious
questions with respect to the constitutionality of the Christenson
decision. In Malloy the Court held that the fifth amendment ap-
plies to the states through the fourteenth amendment and em-
phasized the right of a person to remain silent and to suffer no
penalty for his silence.' 7 Spevack states that the "penalty" re-
ferred to in Malloy is not limited to fine or imprisonment and
cites Griffin for the proposition that a penalty consists of any-
11. See notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text.
12. It should be noted that in order to achieve equitable con-
sistency the defendant who interposes a counterclaim for divorce would
have to be held to the same standard. He also seeks affirmative relief
and should not be allowed to invoke the privilege without having his
pleadings stricken. A contrary decision would lead to inequitable re-
sults.
13. Christensen v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 524, 162 N.W.2d 194,
204 (1968).
14. 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
15. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
16. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
17. 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
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thing which makes the assertion of the fifth amendment privi-
lege "costly.""' Since these cases were not civil actions,1" it is
questionable whether the holdings should apply to the instant
case. In a civil case such as Christenson it is the plaintiff him-
self who has instituted the action seeking equitable relief and
he does not face either imprisonment or a fine. It may be that in
such a situation the court is justified in forcing him to waive his
privilege if he wishes to retain his action. Such a holding would
promote the disclosure of all relevant facts prior to trial and re-
duce the amount of gamesmanship that might otherwise take
place during the trial. Also, the court may draw a distinction
between one who takes the affirmative step of approaching the
court, asking that justice be done and one who is defending
himself in an action initiated by the petition of another party.
With respect to the plaintiff seeking affirmative relief, the court
may be justified in putting to proof his "clean hands." However,
it cannot be denied that having one's pleadings stricken is a
"costly" penalty to pay for the assertion of a constitutional
guarantee.
The constitutionality of compelling a waiver of the privilege
could well be a moot issue if the person testifying in order to pre-
serve his cause of action is accorded immunity from prosecu-
tion. In the instant case the testimony of the plaintiff could
theoretically have led to her prosecution for adultery under
Minnesota law.20 Both the United States Supreme Court and the
Minnesota Supreme Court have allowed testimony to be com-
pelled where statutory immunity from prosecution exists and
provides equivalent protection to the privilege itself.21 A read-
ing of the general immunity statute of Minnesota and the ac-
18. 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967).
19. In Malloy the petitioner who was on probation for a gambling
misdemeanor refused to answer certain questions concerning his ac-
tivities put to him by a court-appointed referee on the grounds that the
answers might incriminate him. The Court reversed his contempt cita-
tion and commitment to prison. In Griffin the Court held that the
prosecutor in a criminal action could not comment to the jury on the de-
fendant's failure to testify as to certain facts because such facts might be
incriminating. Such comment violated his fifth amendment rights. In
Spevack the Court held that an attorney could not be disbarred for fail-
ure to produce records which might incriminate him in a disciplinary
proceeding.
20. MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (1969) provides a penalty for adultery of
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not
more than $1,000 or both.
21. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); State v. Ruff,
176 Minn. 308, 223 N.W. 144 (1929).
[Vol. 55:348
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companying Advisory Committee Comment indicates that the
statute would be inapplicable to the instant case.22 However, if
immunity from prosecution were to be extended by the court
even when the immunity statute is inapplicable, then the protec-
tion accorded would be as adequate as that provided by the privi-
lege itself.23
The definition of "costly" in a civil action is not clear at this
time and the constitutionality of the Christenson holding is an
open question. Nevertheless, there seems to be little question
that the dictum in Christenson would extend its holding to all
civil cases and thereby require one seeking affirmative relief to
forego his privilege against self-incrimination at the pre-trial
level or have his pleading stricken.
22. mNN. STAT. § 609.09(1) (1969) applies only to a criminal pro-
ceeding, paternity proceeding or proceeding in juvenile court. Subdivi-
sion 2 applies to every case not included in subdivision 1, but the Ad-
visory Committee Comment indicates that it is meant to become opera-
live when other statutes dealing with specific crimes grant immunity
to a person compelled to testify with respect to those crimes. This in-
ference is derived from the fact that subdivision 2, except for the
introductory clause, is taken from MN. STAT. § 610.47, the original
immunity statute, which applied only to those cases outlined above.
23. It should be noted that immunity from prosecution does not
protect the person's reputation from damage due to information which
may be drawn out by his testimony. However, the privilege against
self-incrimination is designed to protect a person from prosecution, and
the immunity granted meets this objective.
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Landlord-Tenant Law: Demise of the No Repair Rule
The plaintiff-landlord brought an action in the District of
Columbia General Sessions Court for possession of leased premi-
ses alleging the non-payment of that month's rent due under a
written lease. The defendant-tenants involved admitted the
non-payment of rent, but in defense offered to prove that the
plaintiff had suffered 1500 violations of the District of Colum-
bia Housing Code (D.C.H.C.), which had arisen during their ten-
ancies and which directly or indirectly affected their premises,
to go uncorrected. The trial court rejected this offer and en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals affirmed on the ground that plaintiff had no statutory,
contractual or common law obligation to repair leased premises.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, holding that under both common law and the
D.C.H.C. there exists an implied warranty of habitability in leases
of urban dwelling units, whose standards are measured by the
D.C.H.C. and that violation of such warranty gives rise to a pri-
vate cause of action in the injured tenant for ordinary contract
remedies. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
The common law2 held that a lessor of property gave no
implied warranty to the lessee with respect to the fitness or
habitability of the demised premises and owed the lessee no duty
to repair deteriorations occurring or appearing after the inception
of the lease term.3 Neither condition-premises unfit for human
habitation ab initio or subsequent impairment or destruction of
the premises-provided the tenant with a claim or defense against
his landlord. The tenant could not abate his rent, recover
damages or abandon his lease.4  This rule went so far as to
make protection extended by law to third parties or strangers
against nuisances or concealed, latent defects on the leased prop-
1. Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. 1968).
2. Although the present case was decided in the District of
Columbia, citation of authorities will be focused on Minnesota. The
common law of the two jurisdictions is substantially identical in the
landlord-tenant area.
3. DUNNELL'S MINN. DIG. §§ 5368, 5393 & 5397 (3d ed. 1953) and cases
cited; Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1453 (1919), 13 A.L.R. 818 (1921). This will be
referred to as the no warranty - no repair rule.
4. DUNNELL'S MINN. DIG. §§ 5459 & 5460 (3d ed. 1953). See, e.g.,
Annot., 26 A.L.R. 1265 (1923), 64 A.L.R. 900 (1929). Compare Kitchen v.
Landy, 215 App. Div. 586, 214 N.Y.S. 241 (1926).
CASE COMMENTS
erty unavailable to the tenant against his landlord. 5 Under
some very narrow, hence marginally useful, circumstances, the
defense of recoupment was available to the tenant.0
These consequences flowed from the common law's concept-
ualization of a lease as a conveyance of an interest in realty.
Such conveyances theretofore had occurred in agrarian rural
England where the lessee was acquiring an interest in land, and
was capable of protecting his own interests. The caveat lessee
rule fairly reflected the intentions and expectations of the par-
ties. Another possible source of the no warranty-no repair rule
was the ancient doctrine of waste. The law expanded the lessor's
right to enjoin waste of the demised property to the extent of
imposing upon the lessee the duty of keeping the property in
good repair.7
Changing social conditions, population distributions and
housing practices began to make the application of the no war-
ranty-no repair rule harsh and unjust in a variety of new cir-
cumstances. Courts began to carve exceptions to the strict rule
in those cases where prevailing social expectations and underly-
ing conditions demanded modification. One of the first excep-
tions was the so-called "furnished dwelling" rule. In short term
leases of furnished dwellings intended for immediate occupancy
and use as a dwelling, the law implied a warranty running
from landlord to tenant that the premises were fit for their in-
tended use, namely, that they were habitable.8 A tenant could
obtain a recission of his lease in cases where he was able to prove
deceit by the landlord in the landlord's failure to disclose a
known, concealed hazard or condition which rendered the de-
mised premises uninhabitable.9 Another exception to the no
warranty-no repair rule was found to exist where the landlord
retained control over areas used by tenants and others in com-
mon and not leased to individual tenants.10 In such cases, the
landlord was held to have reserved such areas for the benefit of
all tenants, and to be under an implied obligation to all persons
5. Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
6. Such circumstances consist of an actual, substantial and wrong-
ful interference by the landlord with the tenant's enjoyment of the de-
mised premises to the tenant's injury, which interference arises out of
the same contract or obligation under which the landlord sues.
7. 428 F.2d at 1077 rL30.
8. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
9. Ryberg v. Ebnet, 218 Minn. 115, 15 N.W.2d 456 (1944); Breim-
horst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
10. Cf. Washington Chocolate Co. v. Kent, 28 Wash. 2d 448, 183 P.2d
514 (1947).
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using such areas to "exercise ordinary and reasonable care to
keep the same in repair."'" The remedy for the tenant was
to abandon the lease and vacate without liability. This relief is
characterized as the constructive eviction doctrine. The doctrine
grew from the landlord's duty to refrain from interfering with
his tenant's use and enjoyment of the leased premises. The doc-
trine was not limited to common areas-a constructive eviction
consists of any substantial impairment of the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the demised premises caused or allowed to exist by the
landlord. 12 Thus, when vermin or water is allowed to enter an
apartment from areas within the lessor's building but beyond the
domain of the tenant, the landlord is usually held responsible.
Some showing of a duty of the landlord must still be made by
the tenant. The landlord's failure to correct the condition con-
stitutes a constructive eviction entitling the tenant to renounce
his lease and vacate without liability.' 3 This is the tenant's only
remedy and it must be exercised within a relatively short time
following the eviction. Minnesota courts have extended the doc-
trine to include a case where the landlord's failure to protect a
tenant from a continually noisy neighbor drove the tenant from
her apartment.' 4 Other than the listed exceptions, the lessor was
not held to an implied warranty that the premises leased were or
would continue to be fit for habitation. A scattered handful of
cases have held to the contrary, but these represent a distinct
minority view and do not constitute a trend, except to the extent
that some of the more recent cases have expanded the construc-
tive eviction rule to apply to incursions arising after the inception
of the lease term.'5 In the instant case the court of appeals, in an
11. DUNNELL'S MINN. Dic. § 5369(4) (3d ed. 1953).
12. Ray Realty v. Holtzman, 119 S.W.2d 981, 984 (Mo. 1938).
13. See DUNNELL'S MINN. DIG. § 5425 (3d ed. 1953). See, e.g., Lief-
man v. Percansky, 186 Minn. 427, 243 N.W. 446 (1932); Delamater v.
Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931); Viehman v. Boelter, 105
Minn. 60, 116 N.W. 1023 (1908) (tenant has reasonable time to vacate);
Rea v. Algren, 104 Minn. 316, 116 N.W. 580 (1908) (failure to make agreed
repairs); Rosenstein v. Cohen, 96 Minn. 336, 104 N.W. 965 (1905) (decay
of building). Cases from other jurisdictions include: Smith v. Green-
stone, 208 S.W. 628 (Mo. 1918); Vromania Apts. Co. v. Goodman, 123
S.W. 543 (Mo. 1909); Batterman v. Levenson, 102 Misc. 92, 168 N.Y.S.
197 (1917); Streep v. Simpson, 80 Misc. 666, 141 N.Y.S. 863 (1913).
14. Colonial Court Apts., Inc. v. Kern, 282 Minn. 533, 163 N.W.2d
770 (1968).
15. Smith v. Marrable, 11 M & W 5 (U.K. 1843); Buckner v. Azulai,
59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967); Bonner v. Beecham, 2 CCH Pov. L. RPT.
11,098 (Colo. 1970); Lund v. MacArthur, 462 P.2d 482 (Hawaii 1969);
Lemle v. Breedon, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969); Ryberg v. Ebnet, 218
Minn. 115, 15 N.W.2d 456 (1944); Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428,
[Vol. 55:354
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opinion by Judge Wright, held that the no warranty-no repair
rule was no longer operative in leases of urban dwelling units.
The holding was based alternatively upon a review of the com-
mon law and upon an interpretation of the D.C.H.C.'0
In holding the no repair rule obsolete under common law,
the court relied on three considerations. First, neither the pre-
suppositions nor underlying circumstances of the old rule were
present in leases of urban dwellings. The res of the agreement is
no longer a transfer of an interest in land, but rather a sale of
shelter and ancillary services. 17 The modern tenant, moreover,
lacks the tenure, skill and capital which made the no repair rule
reasonable in the sixteenth century. The court referred to com-
mon law recognition of these factors in the different rules im-
posed on innkeepers' s and in the exceptions to the general no
repair rule outlined above. Second, consumer protection prin-
ciples applicable in other commercial transactions are equally
applicable to the urban housing business. Where landlords sell
housing on a contractual basis, as a business enterprise, tenants
must rely on the skill and bona fides of the landlord to sell dwell-
ings of merchantable quality.19 This is particularly true in
most urban housing markets where suitable housing is not widely
available, landlords occupy a position of dominance and printed
form leases constitute contracts of adhesion.2 0 The tenant who is
obligated to continue paying the same or increased rentals is en-
titled to expect the preservation of the initial condition of the
premises.21  Third, the nature of the urban housing industry,
which creates the need outlined above for consumer protection,
239 N.W. 148 (1931); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969); Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, 139 N.Y.S. 1050, 1051
(1913); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 412 (1961).
16. 428 F.2d at 1072, 1077, 1082.
17. The court included such services as heat, light, utilities, sanita-
tion and maintenance.
18. Innkeepers in England, like modern urban landlords, sold
shelter and ancillary services for defined, usually short, terms. They
were generally held to a much higher duty to their tenants than lessors
of realty. See 40 AM. JuI. 2D, Hotels, Motels, and Restaurants §§ 1, 56,
81, 82, 87, 91, 95, 100 & 115-119 (1968).
19. Compare, UNiroam CoMnvmcrAL CODE §§ 2-314 & 2-315 (1962
Official Text).
20. See Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960).
21. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968), held
that violations of the D.C.H.C. at the inception of the lease rendered
the contract illegal and void. Why should a different rule obtain for
subsequent deterioration of the demised premises?
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also demands abrogation of the no repair rule22 for broader
reasons. Substandard housing has an obvious deleterious effect
on the community at large in addition to that on the unfortu-
nate occupants. Slum housing breeds frustration and crime, as
well as being an eyesore and health menace. Thus, the com-
munity interest coincides with the tenant's with respect to the
no repair rule. Each of these considerations was held to require
that the implied, continuing warranty of habitability be nonex-
cludable by contract.23 This is the first case to establish this im-
portant principle without equivocation or qualification. 2" Both
the Michigan and Rhode Island statutes allow waivers of the
statutory warranty in leases for terms exceeding one year. This
largely vitiates the right nominally given by the statutes.2
The court alternatively concluded that the D.C.H.C., al-
though silent regarding private remedies, created an ongoing
duty of the landlord to comply with the Code.20 This duty ex-
tends to the tenant as well as the community and may be re-
lied upon and enforced by the tenant. The court invoked the
established principle of law that contracts are deemed to in-
corporate prevailing law.27 Thus, leases covered by the Code are
deemed to incorporate the D.C.H.C., and the landlord's duty is
measured by the requirements of that Housing Code.
The court concludes that the tenant's contractual obligation
to pay rent is conditioned upon performance by the landlord of
duties owed to the tenant-one of which is substantial compli-
ance with the Housing Code. Breach of such duty justifies, ac-
cording to the judgment of the trier of fact regarding the sub-
stantiality of the breach, an abatement or suspension of rent un-
til cured.28 The opinion fails, however, to elaborate any stand-
ards to guide the fact finders in this inquiry.
The Javins decision does not constitute a substantial depar-
ture from an established rule of law. The court's logic in refus-
ing to apply the no repair rule to leases or urban apartments is
22. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968) had
already eliminated the no warranty rule in the District of Columbia,
insofar as the D.C.H.C. defines habitability.
23. 428 F.2d at 1081-82.
24. Buckner v. Azulai was an aberration and the result was reached
very circuitously. Other cases spoke in terms of the intent of the par-
ties, which clearly comprehends a waiver of the right or the remedy.
25. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1970); R.I. G~m,.
LAws ANN. § 34-18-16 (1969). The Michigan statute is noted in 15
WAYNE L. REv. 836 (1969).
26. 428 F.2d at 1081.
27. See 17 AM. Jur. 2D, Contracts § 257 (1968).
28. 428 F.2d at 1083.
[Vol. 55:354
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sound. The rule made good sense, and reasonably reflected the
underlying circumstances and fair expectations of the parties, in
rural land leases and commercial leases of whole properties, and
continues to do so today. So limited, the no repair rule is fair
and should continue to be enforced. But for the same reasons, the
rule is inappropriate in the context of leases of urban dwelling
units, producing as it has harsh and inequitable results without
redeeming reason. The court's analogy to Henningson,29 which
established the implied warranty of fitness in sales cases, more-
over, is well taken. The discussion of policy and purpose in the
Henningson opinion is equally persuasive in the Javins context,
and provides a rational and humane basis for the rule which
emerges from the present case. Similarly, the judicial recogni-
tion of a private cause of action based on a housing code is
neither unique3o nor undesirable. Recognition of this right of
action has such beneficial effects as furthering the scope and
degree of enforcement of a salutary housing code, providing con-
crete and readily ascertainable standards of habitability and
equalizing the relative positions of tenants and landlords.3'
Nor is the Javins decision an exercise in judicial creativity-
legal precedents do exist for the decision reached by the circuit
court. In Smith v. Marrabe,32 the court, in a case involving a
short term lease of an urban dwelling, ruled that such written
leases, if silent on the subject, carried an implied legal obliga-
tion that the premises be fit for habitation. The statement of the
rule is broader than the customary furnished dwelling exception.
A concurring opinion would have imposed strict liability on a
landlord who without knowledge leased a house infected with a
lethal disease. In Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit 33 the no warranty
rule was limited to those trivial conditions ordinarily con-
trollable by housewives. Otherwise, on the basis of reasoning
anticipating that in Javins, the Barnard court held that the
tenants "ought not to be compelled to pay rent for an apartment in
which they could not live."34 The Minnesota Supreme Court,
29. Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
30. Compare the judicially sanctioned private remedy under the
federal securities laws, which are as silent as the D.C.I.C. about such a
right.
31. The threat of abuse by tenants of such a right of action should
be no greater here than in any other area where a socio-economically
disadvantaged class has been given effective legal protection.
32. 11 M & W 5 (UK. 1843).
33. 155 App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y.S. 1050 (1913).
34. Id. at 183, 139 N.Y.S. at 1051.
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along similar lines of thought, reached a comparable conclu-
sion-that the lessor of an urban apartment gives an "implied
covenant that the premises will be habitable."35  In Ryberg v.
Ebnet 36 the Minnesota Court listed fitness for the intended use,
i.e., habitability, as one of several bases for shifting the responsi-
bility for maintenance of an apartment to the landlord.
The remedy given in these early cases was that of a construc-
tive eviction-the tenant was held entitled to abandon the lease
and vacate the premises without liability. This remedy has its
inherent drawbacks. In the cases where the need for decent
housing is the most urgent, this remedy is the least effective,
since the tenant is merely given the right to search for another
substandard apartment, and the landlord is free to rerent the un-
improved apartment to another helpless tenant. This situation
serves only the interests of the slumlord.
Conceptually, an implied, continuing warranty of habitability
is only an affirmative manner of expressing in terms of the
tenant's right the duty imposed on the landlord by the construc-
tive eviction doctrine. A constructive eviction consists of the
landlord causing or allowing a substantial interference with the
beneficial enjoyment of the subject of the lease. This definition
clearly subsumes those defects in an apartment which render it
uninhabitable. Such defects, moreover, be they infestations of
vermin, utility or sanitation system breakdowns or physical de-
terioration, are necessarily under the control of the landlord and
beyond that of the tenant as required by the constructive
eviction doctrine. Courts also had already expanded the doctrine
in many cases to include encroachments arising during
the term of the lease.37 The recognition, therefore, of a continu-
ing warranty or covenant of habitability is not a new right, but a
rephrasing in affirmative terms of a previously existing right
of the tenant.
The warranty of habitability, like the apartment lease from
which it arises, is a contractual creature. Breach of this contract
should entitle the tenant to the ordinary panoply of contract
remedies, including, but not limited to, recission.38  The break-
through in remedies allowed to tenants came in 1961 in Pines v.
35. Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 430, 239 N.W. 148, 149
(1931).
36. 218 Minn. 115, 15 N.W.2d 456 (1944).
37. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
38. This is the civil law view. See 428 F.2d 1075 n.13 and authori-
ties cited.
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Perssion.3 9 The landlord's breach of duty measured by the ap-
plicable housing code was there held to justify a rent abatement.
This approach has slowly spread to other jurisdictions," cul-
minating with the Javins decision which brings together the prin-
ciples inherent but not always explicit in the other cases.4 1
The Javins opinion also stated in a dictum that one of the con-
tract remedies available to a wronged tenant was the injunction
to secure specific performance of the implied covenant. This
remedy is novel, but does follow from the premise of the con-
tractual nature of the urban dwelling lease.42 It may be ex-
pected that recognition of ordinary contract remedies in cases
of constructive evictions which cause uninhabitability, limited as
in Javins,43 will occur in an increasing number of jurisdictions.4
39. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 412 (1961).
40. Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal Rptr. 806 (1967); Bonner v. Beecham,
CCH Pov. L. RTRv. 1 11,098 (Colo. 1970); Lund v. MacArthur, 462 P.2d
482 (Hawaii 1969); Lemle v. Breedon, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969); Reste
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Sayko v.
Bishop, CCH Pov. L. Rpn 1110,789 (N.Y. 1969).
41. Compare Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970)
(tenant held entitled to deduct cost of necessary repairs, provided no-
tice is given or attempted, rather than have to vacate; rent abatement
not allowed).
42. See, e.g., Lipkin v. Burnstine, 18 IMI. App. 2d 509, 152 N.E.2d 745
(1958); Fazzio v. Riverside Realty Co., 232 La. 794, 95 So. 2d 315 (1957);
Galland v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 124 Misc. 371, 208 N.Y.S. 144, ret'd on
other grounds, 220 App. Div. 704, 221 N.Y.S. 437 (1925). But see, e.g.,
Burt v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 129, 163 N.E.2d 4, 7 (1959)(injunction favored in dicta); Feigenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash. 2d 125,
131, 401 P.2d 642, 646 (1965) (same).
43. Violations of the Housing Code not the fault of the tenant which
substantially affect the tenant's apartment or common areas. Violations
need not be verified or certified by city housing inspectors. 428 F.2d at
1080. Accord Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492, 494
(D.C. 1969).
44. Unanswered, but important questions in Minnesota involve the
effect of the Minnesota statute (Minn. Stat. § 507.16 (1969)) which
holds that there is no implied warranty in conveyances of realty, with
leases of less than three years specifically excepted. This could be the
basis of a similar warranty in Minnesota. However, there remains the
question of what is to be the measure of such a warranty in those many
communities which have no housing code. Courts presumably could
fashion the parameters of such a warranty given time and the inclina-
tion.
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